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Abstract
Weconsideravery simplecompetitiveeconomy with in¯nitesimal agents
and asymmetric information. We de¯ne a Common Knowledge (CK here-
after) Equilibrium as a price distribution compatible with CK of market
clearing and rationality. At equilibrium, expectational mistakes and incor-
rect information revelation by price are possible. But, whenever unique,
the CK equilibrium is a fully revealing Rational Expectations Equilibrium.
Henceuniqueness of equilibrium meansmarket informational e±ciency. We
give di®erent conditions of uniqueness of equilibrium bearing on the infor-
mation structure. The ¯rst ones emphasize that many informed agents are
required for market e±ciency. Agents need not be perfectly informed, but
each "piece" of information has to be known by a large enough proportion
of the population. The main result is a characterization of the information
structures allowing for local uniqueness: multiplicity of equilibria obtains
when all the agents have to extract information from the price to obtain
information about the same event. We show that this result holds in an
exchange economy with ¯nitely many goods and generic preferences. Fi-
nally, we provide a simple market game in which the CK-equilibria obtain
through in¯nitely repeated elimination of weakly dominated strategies.
1. Introduction
This paper is an attempt to discuss the informational e±ciency of the price (the
so-called E±cient Market Hypothesis) using a weaker solution concept than the
¤THEMA, universit¶ e de Cergy-Pontoise. gabriel.desgranges@eco.u-cergy.fr. I thank Bruno
Biais, Fran» coise Forges and my thesis advisor, Roger Guesnerie, for comments. I began this
work while I was completing my doctoral thesis at DELTA (Joint Reseach Unit CNRS EHESS
ENS). Remaining errors are mine.usual Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE hereafter). We call this solution
concept Common Knowledge Equilibrium (CK equilibrium hereafter) because it is
de¯ned as a pricedistributioncompatible withcommonknowledge (CK hereafter)
of rationality and market clearing. The REE is a speci¯c CK equilibrium: it
requires also CK of the expected price distribution.
In a competitive economy with incomplete and asymmetric information, the
traditional solution concept is REE. The most striking results in this REE liter-
ature are among the oldest ones. Grossman (1976) and Radner (1979) show that
REE is generically fully revealing, i.e. every agent learns from the price all the
relevant information, public and private, available among the whole population.
This result sustains the E±cient Market Hypothesis in its strong form. However,
it looks paradoxical because, at a fully revealing REE, there is no incentive to
use private information and therefore no reason for which prices should aggregate
private information (Grossman and Stiglitz 1980).
This paper considers the in°uence of expectational coordination on market ef-
¯ciency. It applies to a setting with asymmetric information a method de¯ned in
Guesnerie (1992) in acase with complete information.1 The point of view adopted
in this paper is then the following. The important question is not existence of CK
equilibrium (following from existence of REE) but uniqueness of CK equilibrium.
A unique CK equilibrium means that CK of expectations and actions is the con-
sequence of the two assumptions of CK of rationality and market clearing only.
Notice then that the unique CK equilibrium is a fully revealing REE. Hence, the
conditions of uniqueness are conditions of market informational e±ciency: if there
is a unique CK equilibrium, then market e±ciency follows from CK of rationality
and market clearing only. No other a priori knowledge about agents'actions is
required.
Otherwise, there are multiple equilibria, meaning failure of the expectational
coordination triggered by CK assumptions. When they are not REE, CK equilib-
ria namely involve mistakes by agents. Hence, with multiple equilibria, incorrect
learning from prices may be a plausible outcome of competitive markets.
A motivation for this CK equilibrium concept can be found in Guesnerie
(1992). In this line, CK equilibria are the consequence of a so-called "eductive"
learning in virtual time. Eductive learning assumes that every agent computes
the set of outcomes compatible with the CK assumptions and, whenever he pre-
dicts the only possible outcome is a REE, he plays a REE strategy. This is an
1The present work about asymmetric information originates in Desgranges (1994) and Des-
granges and Guesnerie (1996). Desgranges, Guesnerie and Geo®ard (1998) consider the simplest
version of the model used in this paper and they add some exogenous random supply. Desgranges
(1999b) studies the model of Grossman (1976) with a random supply. Some of the results in
this paper comes from my doctoral thesis (Desgranges 1999a).
2individual learning with no communication, no observation of past prices and no
t^ atonnement across times. But an interesting question would be to ¯nd other
motivations for CK equilibria, namely a class of real time learning algorithms
converging to the CK equilibria.2
The most related literature is Dutta and Morris (1997), Mac Allister
(1990) and Morris (1995). In these papers, similar solution concepts relying
on CK assumptions are de¯ned. Examples of competitive economies are given in
which the REEs are, or are not the only equilibria. Hence, these papers show that,
when information is incomplete and asymmetric, the REE is not the consequence
of CK of rationality and market clearing (i.e. rules of the game) only, it also
requires a stronger assumption like CK of every agent's expectations. However,
they do not give conditions implying that the REE is the unique equilibrium. This
is exactly the question that we address.
In other contexts than competitive economies with asymmetric information,
this question has been already considered. The solution concepts can then be
called rationalizable solutions, dominant solvable solutions, correlated equilibria.
They all rely on the same idea: there is no CK of actions played by agents andthis
implies that suboptimal decisions can betaken. This is what we call acoordination
failure. Among (not so) many examples are Battigalli (1996), Guesnerie (1992),
Moulin(1979), Watson(1993). The caseofgameswithstrategic complementarities
is examined in Milgrom and Roberts (1990). This is the broadest class of games
(which does not encompass the model in this paper) for which conditions for
uniqueness of the CK-solution are known (namely, this condition is uniqueness of
Nash equilibrium). Notice also that the idea of agents ignoring others'actions can
be taken into account with Bayesian Nash equilibrium also. This is the approach
considered in Morris and Shin (1998a) and Morris and Shin (1998b).
There are alternative approaches of the E±cient Market Hypothesis. Recent
papers include BlumeandEasley (1999), Routledge (1999) and Vives (1993). They
consider learning in a repeated game (either Bayesian or by boundedly rational
agents). Their results are more optimistic than thoseinthe present paper. Further
research is needed to understand how they relate to the CK approach.
Section 2 presents the model. This is a simple model somewhat inspired from
the inventory model in Guesnerie and Rochet (1993). It looks like a 2 goods
exchange economy with asymmetric information. Uncertainty bears on a single
2About this point, notice that the replicator dynamics (see Weibull 1995) or the evolutionary
stochastic stability of Young (1998) eliminates every iteratively (strictly, at least) dominated
strategies in the long run. See also the special issue (vol. 29, 1999) of Games and Economic
Behavior showing possible learning of correlated equilibria.
3parameter taking ¯nitely many values. In Section 3, we give a technical char-
acterization of uniqueness of equilibrium. We then derive some explicit su±cient
conditions of uniqueness. They show that uniqueness of equilibrium is related to
many agents being perfectly informed. However, no perfectly informed agent is
required as soon as every one is well informed enough.
In Section 4, we show the main result in the paper: The fully revealing
(Rational Expectations) equilibrium islocally unique ifandonly if theinformation
structure is "sharp". A sharp information structure means that, in each state and
for each value of the unknown parameter, some agents learn from their private
information that this value has not occurred with probability 1 (whenever it is the
case). When information is not sharp, it is said to be di®use and it is such that,
at some states, all the agents need to extract information from the price to obtain
information about the same event. Di®use information structures include many
usual settings. For example, an information structure where every agent observes
the true value of µ with a given probability and another wrong value with the
complementary probability is di®use. Hence this result suggests that, with di®use
information, it is very demanding to obtain the REE as a plausible outcome of a
competitive market.
In Section 5, we show that CK equilibriacanhave well de¯nedgame-theoretical
foundations. We de¯ne a market game in which agents submit simultaneously a
demand curve to a "walrassian" auctioneer. This auctioneer observes the aggre-
gate demand curve only and he chooses the price among the set of market clearing
prices (according to a well de¯ned stochastic rule). This implementation mecha-
nism is relatively poor, it mimics competitive market clearing. We show that CK
equilibria are the price distributions compatible with in¯nitely iterated elimina-
tion of all the weakly dominated strategies. The fully revealing REE coincides
with a Nash equilibrium of the game if and only if the information structure is
"di®use".3
In section 6, we show that the characterization of local uniqueness extends to
a generic competitive exchange economy. Section 7 concludes.
2. A ¯rst one dimensional model and the equilibrium con-
cepts
2.1. A model with two goods and a simple information structure
We consider a static exchange economy with two goods and a continuum of in-
¯nitesimal agents. The reduced form of the model is very simple. It is inspired of
3This last result makes precise a kind of impossibility of REE implementation that was
noticed in Hellwig (1980).
4the inventory model in Guesnerie and Rochet (1993). It can be also interpreted
as a model of exchange of a risky asset. In any case, this model is a simple case of
the competitive exchange economies with asymmetric information that are con-
sidered in the REE literature. In particular, the results of Radner (1979) apply
(see below).
² There is one good whose future value µ is unknown. Its current price is
denoted p. The parameter µ describes all the intrinsic uncertainty (i.e. the
uncertainty on fundamentals, not the uncertainty on others'actions). The
other good is the num¶ eraire, its price and future value are normalized to 1
and this good can be omitted.
² Agents haveidentical preferences andendowments(thatcouldbe normalized
to 0).4 They di®er in their private information only. Every agent's private
information about µ is described by a privately observed signal si. We
assume that individual demand for the risky good has the following form:5
x(si;p) = E(µjsi;p) ¡ p
where E(µjsi;p) is the mean of the future value µ conditionally to the price
being p and the private signal being si. The beliefs of an agent at (si;p), i.e.
the conditional distribution P (µjsi;p), can be arbitrary at this stage. De¯n-
ing conditions on these beliefs consists precisely in de¯ning an equilibrium
concept.
This demand is derived from the maximization of the expected objective
function (µ ¡ p)x¡x2=2 (x2=2 is interpreted as a quadratic inventory cost).
Notice that demand is not linear because E(µjsi;p) is a function of p. This is
precisely this functional dependence of E(µjsi;p) that embodies the ability
of agents to extract information from the price.
² The population is identi¯ed to the interval [0;1] (endowed with Lebesgue
measure). It is divided into ¯nitely many I groups of size ®i (
P
i®i =
1). Agents being in¯nitesimal, an individual demand has no in°uence on
aggregate demand and no agent can manipulate the information revealed
by price. In particular, agents can rationally consider the price distribution
4Notice that, due to the very speci¯c form of preferences, only aggregate endowment has to
be certain. Idiosyncratic shocks on individual endowment are possible as they do not in°uence
aggregate demand.
5We assume linear demand for simplicity. It must be clear that every argument in the paper
holds true as long as demand is monotonic. Only some computational details would be mod-
i¯ed. The last section consider a N goods economy and it gives some insights about possible
generalizations of the results.
5as given when computing their optimal demand. Therefore, the problem
we consider is only a problem of coordination of expectations, not
one of credible revelation of private information. Let Z(s;p) = R
[0;1] xk(sk;p)dk the aggregate demand when priceis p and the pooledsignal
is s. Z(s;p) depends on every agent's beliefs on µ.6
The information structure is the following. The private information of an
agent consists in a signal si in a set Si. Every agent in the same group i observes
the same signal si. The vector s = (s1;:::;sI) is the pooled signal and S denotes
the Cartesian product of the Si. Let µ(s) the unique value7 of µ revealed by the
pooled signal s and £ the ¯nite set of the possible values of µ. Let ¼ the common
prior distribution of the (µ;s) (notice ¼(µjs) > 0 if and only if µ = µ(s)).8 Let
µ (si) the subset of £ consisting in all the µ compatible with signal si (µ 2 µ (si)
if and only if ¼ (µjsi) > 0).
We call the information structure "simple" in this section's title because we
assume the following axiom:
Axiom 1. Every pooled signal s inS reveals a di®erent value µ(s) of µ (s 6= s0 )
µ (s) 6= µ(s0)). Hence the two sets £ and S can be fully identi¯ed.
This axiom will be relaxed in Section 4. Notice that the private information
of group i de¯nes a partition on the set S (or, equivalently, the set £), namely s
and s0 belongs to the same element in the partition if and only if si = s0
i.
2.2. Common Knowledge Equilibrium and Rational Expectations Equi-
librium
We de¯ne an equilibrium concept relying on CK assumptions and we compare
it to the usual REE. Analogous equilibria are de¯ned in Mc Allister (1990) and
Dutta and Morris (1997). The two properties that will be CK at equilibrium are:
De¯nition 2.1. i) (rationality) every agent i in [0;1] is rational at a price p
if and only if, for every i and every si in Si, there is a conditional probability





6This de¯nition assumes some measurability properties of the individual demands. We do
not enter into technical details.
7This is without loss of generality: µ (s) is simply de¯ned as being all the relevant information
revealed by the signal s.
8With heterogenous prior distributions ¼i, the results still hold true as long as ¼ i(µ) > 0 for
every i and µ (for every argument, only the support of the beliefs matters).








ii) (market clearing) Market clearing obtains at a price p in state s if and
only if aggregate demand:
Z (s;p) = 0
The ¯rst "rationality" assumption means that bayesian rationality of every
agent at p, i.e. every individual demand maximizes expected utility for an arbi-
trary probability distribution on µ. The important point is that this probability
distributions Pi(sjp) and Pi (µjsi;p) can di®er across agents (even if they observe
the same private signal si). Notice that Pi(µjsi;p) can be any probability distribu-
tion with support in µ (si) (the set of values of µ to which signal si gives positive
probability).
The second "market clearing" assumption is self understanding.
We now give a formal content to the consequences of CK of rationality and
market clearing at a given price p. We de¯ne iteratively a decreasing sequence of
sets µ
n (p) of values of µ compatible with n levels of knowledge of rationality and
market clearing at p.
² Let µ
0(p) = £ the set of all possible values of µ.
² µ
1(p) is de¯ned in the following way: µ 2 µ
1(p) if and only if, for every
agent i, there is a conditional probability distribution Pi(µjp) with support











where the conditional distributions Pi(µjsi;p) are obtained by bayesian up-
dating. µ
1(p) is the set of values ofµ compatiblewith rationality and market
clearing at p.
² µ
2(p) is de¯ned in the same way: for every µ 2 µ
1(p), µ 2 µ
2(p) if and
only if, for every agent i, there is a conditional probability distribution
Pi(µjp) with support in µ
1(p) such that the aggregate demand computed
with these Pi(µjp) clears market. µ2(p) is the set of values of µ compatible
with rationality and market clearing at p and knowledge of these facts.
9Remind ¼ is the common prior distribution and the pooled signal s and the value of µ
revealed by s can be identi¯ed without confusion.
7² ...
² µ
n+1(p) is de¯ned in the same way: for every µ 2 µ
n(p), µ 2 µ
n+1(p) if
and only if, for every agent i, there is a conditional probability distribution
Pi(µjp) with support in µ
n(p) such that the aggregate demand computed
with these Pi(µjp) clears market. µ
n (p) is the set of values of µ compati-
ble with rationality and market clearing at p, knowledge of these facts, ...,
knowledge of knowledge of ... (repeated n ¡ 1 times) ... of these facts.
² ...
As the sequence µ





De¯nition 2.2. i) µ
1(p) is the set of values of µ that are compatible with com-
mon knowledge of rationality and market clearing at p.
ii) An individual beliefs Pi(µjsi;p) is compatible with common knowledge of
rationality and market clearing at p
if and only if there is a distribution Pi (µjp) with support in µ
1(p)







if and only if the support of Pi(µjsi;p) is in µ
1(p) \µ(si).
µ
1(p) can be interpreted as the set of values of µ revealed by p. Remind that
µ (si) is the set of values of µ revealed by si (¼(µjsi) > 0). Hence a beliefs is
compatible with the CK assumptions as soon as it gives positive probability to
values of µ revealed by both si and p.
We adopt the following terminology: a function p(:) : S ! I R that maps each
pooledsignal into a price is called a price function; a distribution ¹(s;p) on S£I R
such that the marginal distribution on S is the common prior distribution ¼ is
called a price distribution.
De¯nition 2.3. A CK-equilibrium is a price distribution ¹(s;p) such that, for
every price p and pooled signal s, ¹(s;p) > 0 implies that there exists a collection
of individual beliefs Pi(µjsi;p) compatible with CK of rationality and market
clearing at p, i.e. such that the support of every Pi(µjsi;p)is in µ
1(p) and the
aggregate demand computed with the Pi(µjsi;p) clears market.
10Remind ¼ is the common prior distribution and the pooled signal s and the value of µ
revealed by s can be identi¯ed without confusion.
8At aCK equilibrium, there is noreasonthatevery Pi(µjsi;p) coincides withthe
conditional distribution on µ obtained by bayesian updating of ¼(µjsi) using the
price distribution¹(s;p). This means that, at a CK equilibrium, some agents may
expect a mean value E (µjsi;p) which is di®erent from its true value. Moreover, if
every agent always expects the true value E(µjsi;p), then the CK equilibrium is a
REE (as de¯ned below). Hence, we say that price is not informationally e±cient
at a CK equilibrium unless it is a REE.
Notice also that this equilibrium concept does not specify any price formation
process (like the REE). An example of price formation process is given in Section
5.
The de¯nition of the REE is the usual one:
De¯nition 2.4. A Rational Expectations Equilibrium is a price function p(:) :
S ! I R such that, for every s,
The Radner (1979) result applies:
Result 1 (Radner 1979). Let us call the price function p¤(s) = µ(s) the fully
revealing price function. This price function is a REE. It is generically the unique
REE (with respect to a topology on S and ¼ that could be made precise).
In the present model, this result is straightforward. As we assume that the
values of µ are all distinct, every price p¤(s) reveals the unique value µ(s) and, at
the price p¤(s), every agent demands:
x(si;p¤(s)) = E(µjsi;p¤(s)) ¡ p¤(s) = µ (s) ¡ p¤(s) = 0
and market clears.
The link between CK equilibrium and REE is clear:
Result 2. Every REE is a CK equilibrium. Moreover, every REE is compatible
with CK of every agent's expectations and decisions.
A REE is a very speci¯c CK equilibrium: it requires that everyone correctly
understands the informational content of price and it is compatible.
93. A unique equilibrium: the requirement of many, well
enough informed, agents
In this section, we give conditions of uniqueness of CK equilibrium. It follows
from the above de¯nitions that, whenever there is a unique CK equilibrium, this
equilibrium is the fully revealing REE. Following the above de¯nitions, the con-
ditions of uniqueness are computed through an iterative argument at every price
(bearing on the set of possible values of µ).
A motivation for these results of uniqueness is that they can be interpreted as
conditions of market informational e±ciency. Namely, when there are many CK
equilibria, none of them (but the REE) is fully revealing and one even knows that
some agents at least do not expect the true price distribution and they make mis-
takes when extracting information from price. At these equilibria, market is then
ine±cient in a very strong sense: every agent does not only learn every relevant
information from the price but some agents learn some incorrect information.
We ¯rst describe two examples (with 2 and 3 values of µ respectively). We
then give some results in the general case. They emphasize the role played by the
existence of a large proportion of well informed agents (if not perfectly informed).
3.1. Uniqueness with many perfectly informed agents: an example
This is the case considered in Desgranges (1994) and further analyzed in Des-
granges and Guesnerie (1996). It is the most simple example of the model. There
is two values of µ denoted B and G (let ¢ = G ¡ B > 0). There are only
two groups of agents: a proportion ® of agents observes the true value of µ, the
remaining proportion (1¡ ®) of agents receives no private signal.
The result in Desgranges (1994) can be restated in terms of CK equilibrium.
Result 3. There is a unique CK equilibrium if and only if the proportion ® of
perfectly informed agents satis¯es ® > 1=2. If ® ￿ 1=2, every price in the interval
[R¡ (1¡ ®)¢;V + (1¡ ®)¢] is the price of some CK equilibrium in states B
and G.
Proof. The result is proved iteratively. Notice non informed agents only needs
to extract information from the price. Informed agents have a dominant strategy
(see below step 1).
² Step 1 (rationality and market clearing): every informed agent observes µ
and he demands xInf (µ;p) = µ ¡ p. Every non informed agents demands a
quantity xi (p) in [B ¡ p;G ¡ p]. Hence aggregate demand in state µ is in
an interval [®µ + (1¡ ®)V ¡ p;®µ + (1¡ ®)R¡ p]:





Figure 3.1: Examples of individual demands by a rational agent.
and the price p can clear market in state µ if and only if p is in an interval
Iµ:
p 2 Iµ
def = [®µ + (1¡ ®)V;®µ + (1¡ ®)R]
With the notations of Section 2, the values of µ revealed by the price p are:
µ
1(p) = fBg if p 2 IB ¡ IG
µ1(p) = fGg if p 2 IG ¡ IB
µ
1(p) = fB;Gg if p 2 IB \IG
µ
1(p) = ; otherwise
Only the prices in IB [IG = [B;G] are compatible with rationality and market
clearing.
² Step 2 (knowledge of rationality and market clearing): every non informed
agent learns from step 1 the values of µ revealed by p. Hence 2 cases are
possible:
If ® > 1=2, then IB\IG = ; and every pricecompatible withmarket clearing
reveals either B or G, but never both states. Hence, every non informed
agent demands:
x(p) = B ¡ p if p 2 IB ¡ IG
x(p) = G ¡ p if p 2 IG ¡ IB
It follows that the only market clearing price in state µ after this second
step is the fully revealing REE price p¤(µ) = µ. The REE is then the only





Figure 3.2: Aggregate demands and prices after step 1.
If ® ￿ 1=2, then IB \IG 6= ; and every non informed agent demands:
x(p) = B ¡ p if p 2 IB ¡ IG
x(p) = G ¡ p if p 2 IG ¡ IB
x(p) 2 [B ¡ p;G ¡ p] otherwise
if p reveals both B and G after the ¯rst step, non informed agents learn
nothing. In this case, the market clearing prices in state µ are p¤(µ) = µ
and the prices in IG \IB.
With the notations of Section 2, the values of µ revealed by the price p are:
µ
2(p) = fµg if p = p
¤(µ)
µ
2(p) = fB;Gg if p 2 IB \IG
µ
2(p) = ; otherwise
At every following step, the argument is the same and non informed agents do
not learn anything more (µ
1(p) = µ
2(p) for every p). This proves the Result.
Some comments are in order.
² The proof shows that uniqueness obtains after 2 steps (when there are many
informed agents). This means that the result follows from a much weaker as-






Figure 3.3: Example of market clearing prices distinct from the REE prices when
® ￿ 1=2.
² The iterativeargument determines theset of prices that are compatible with
the CK assumptions in every state µ. But it does not specify what the "op-
timal" demand of a non informed agent would be at other prices, whenever
those prices were to appear for some reason. The argument just says that, if
those prices appeared, this would mean that market is not cleared or some
agents are not rational or some agents have not taken account of the CK
assumptions when choosing their demand.
² When ® > 1=2, uniqueness of CK equilibrium obtains because: Step 1)
there are enough informed agents so that di®erent states µ lead to disjoint
sets of market clearing prices (intervals Iµ in proof); Step 2) non informed
agents can then predict aggregate demand precisely enough so that they
restrict their set of possible behaviors in a way that makes the REE the
only possible price distribution.
² When ® ￿ 1=2, a price p in IB\IG corresponds to 2 polar cases of mistakes:
1) a certain proportion of non informed agents demands B ¡ p and the
others demand G ¡p, some agents make therefore a correct guess; 2) every
non informed agent has the same beliefs E (µjp), beliefs are homogenous but
certainly wrong (because p cannot clear market in both states).
133.2. Uniqueness with few perfectly informed agents: an example
This example shows that the proportion of perfectly informed agents can be arbi-
trary small and, still, there can be a unique CK equilibrium if the non perfectly
informed agents have "enough" private information. It then gives an example of
more intricate situations than the preceding very sharp example.
There are 3 values B(ad), M(iddle), G(ood) of µ (B < M < G). For simplicity,
we normalize:
B = ¡1, M = 0, G = 1
There are 3 groups of agents whose size are respectively ®, ¯ et ° (®+¯+° = 1).
We assume that, thanks to their private signal, agents in group ® distinguish M
from the 2 other states, agents in group ¯ distinguish B and agents in group °
are perfectly informed. Therefore, the partitions of fB;M;Gg de¯ning private
information are:
² fB;Gg and fMg for group ®,
² fBg and fG;Mg for group ¯,
² fBg, fMg and fGg for group °.
Agents ® (resp. ¯) must then learn to distinguish B (resp. M) from G using
the price.
Result 4. There is a unique CK equilibrium if and only if ® < 1=2 and ¯ < 1=2.
Therefore, whatever the proportion ° of perfectly informed agents, there can be
a unique CK equilibrium.
Uniqueness obtains after 3 steps at most. Henceassuming 2levels ofknowledge
of rationality and market clearing is enough.
Proof. After step 1, the sets of possible prices are: PB = [0;2®], PM = [1;1 +¯]
and PG = [¯ + 2°;2] in states B;M and G respectively. Hence the sets µ1(p) of
values of µ revealed by p are:
µ
1(p) = fBg if p 2 PB ¡ PM \ PG
µ
1(p) = fMg if p 2 PM ¡ PB \ PG
µ
1(p) = fGg if p 2 PG ¡PM \PB
µ1(p) = fG;Mg if p 2 PM \ PG ¡ PB
µ
1(p) = fG;Bg if p 2 PB \ PG ¡ PM
µ
1(p) = fB;Mg if p 2 PM \PB ¡ PG
µ
1(p) = fB;G;Mg if p 2 PM \PB \PG
µ1(p) = ; otherwise
14Case of multiplicity. If ¯ ¸ 1=2, the argument proving multiplicity of
equilibrium is the same as in the preceding section: the set PM \ PG ¡ PB is
not empty. For prices in this set, agents ® learn G at step 2. But, still, some
prices p in this set clear market in both states G and M after step 2, implying
µ
2(p) = fG;Mg. Agents ¯ do not learn anything at the following steps. This
is namely the mistakes of agents ¯ that allow these prices to be compatible with
both states G and M (agents ® and ° are perfectly informed at these prices).
The case ® ¸ 1=2 is similar.
If ® < 1=2 and ¯ < 1=2, then it is interesting to distinguish between 3 di®erent
cases.
Case with many perfectly informed agents. If ° > 2=3, the argument
is the same as in the preceding section. The 3 sets are disjoint and uniqueness is
proved after step 2.
Case with simultaneous learning by both groups ® and ¯. If 2® >
¯ + 2°, uniqueness obtains after 3 steps. One sees that
PB \PG 6= ;
PM \PG 6= ;
PB \PM \PG = ;
Step 2 allows agents ® to learn that prices in PB ¡ PG reveals B and that prices
in PG¡PB reveals G. But they learn nothing at a price in PB\PG. In the same
way, Step 2 allows agents ¯ to learn that prices in PM ¡ PG reveals M and that
prices in PG ¡ PM reveals G. But they learn nothing at a price in PM \PG.
The important point is that PB\PM \PG = ; implies that one group at least
learns something at every price. For example, for prices in PB \PG, agents ¯ act
as they were perfectly informed: they demand B ¡ p (resp. G ¡ p) when they
observe the signal fBg (resp. fM;Gg).
Therefore, Step 3 imposes further restrictions. One checks that prices in PB\
PG (resp. PM \ PG) reveals G (resp. M) and no more B (resp. G). Agents ®
and ¯ learn all the information they still needed after step 2.
Case of successive learning of the 2 groups ® and ¯. If 2® < ¯ + 2°,
uniqueness obtains after 3 steps. One sees that:
PB \PG = ;
PM \PG 6= ;
PB \PM \PG = ;
15Step 2 allows agents ® to distinguish B from G at every price (PB \PG = ;)
but agents ¯ do not learn anything at prices in PM \PH 6= ; that reveal fM;Hg.
Step 3 is required for agents ¯ at prices in PM \PH. At a price in PM \PH,
agents ® have learned from step 1 that the true state is H. One checks that, after
step 3, every price in PM \PH reveals one value of at most. This allows agents ¯
to restrict their set of possible demands in a way that makes the REE prices the
only market clearing prices.
3.3. The general case
We now consider the general information structure de¯ned in Section 2. We give
a technical lemma providing a necessary and su±cient condition of uniqueness
of CK equilibrium. We then apply this lemma to give su±cient conditions of
uniqueness in some (hopefully) explicit cases.
Lemma 3.1. There exists aunique CK equilibriumifandonly if, for every subset


































) is the smallest (largest) price in state s compat-





















Theconditioninthe lemmameansthat, whenitisCKthatthe truestate sisin
a given subset ^ S, no price compatible with rationality clears market in every state
of ^ S. The intuitive idea is that, whatever the information already revealed by a
price (summarized by s 2 ^ S), every price reveals a set of values of µ that is strictly
smaller than ^ S and this implies that some agents at least learn something from
the price. This means that a further step of learning is always useful. Therefore,
at every price, every agent successfully achieves complete learning of information
revealed by the price. The only market clearing prices are then the REE prices.







; implies that for every price, µ
1(p) Ã µ
0(p) = £ (no price reveals all the values
of µ). Hence, either p reveals one state or zero (i.e. price does not clear market)
and learning successfully takes place at p; or p reveals at least two states and we
examine the next steps.
Assume, for a given price, µ
n(p) Ã ::: Ã µ
0(p) and µ














n+1(p) contains at most one state and the argument comes to its
end at p; or µ
n+1(p) contains two or more states and we examine the next step.
This shows that the argument comes to its end at every p in #£ at most.













;, then consider p in this intersection. One has necessarily ^ S µ µ
n(p) for every n.
This ends the proof.
A few remarks about the lemma:
² The proof of the lemma proceeds iteratively and the set of CK equilibrium
obtains after #£ only. This shows that the CK assumptions can be relaxed
into assumptions of #£ levels of knowledge.
² The condition in the lemma illustrates the fact that, for each "piece of
information", many agents, who are informed of this piece, are required
to predict aggregate demand precisely enough. Namely, uniqueness of CK
equilibrium obtains whenagents canpredict aggregate demandandthey can
therefore correctly learn information from prices. For example, uniqueness
of CK does not obtain if only few agents knows a given piece of information.
But uniqueness obtains if few agents are not well informed, implying that
this lack of information has a small in°uence on aggregate information.
² The necessity of the condition is illustrated in the ¯rst example with many
perfectly informed agents. When thereare twovalues µ andµ0 (¢ = µ0¡µ0 >
0) distinguished by a proportion ® ￿ 1=2 of agents only, then some prices
clear market in bothstates because non informed agents can make mistakes.
These mistakes can be rationalized precisely because market is cleared in
both states (i.e. they are rationalized by the expectation of mistakes by
others).
This lemma allows for some more explicit conditions of uniqueness of CK-
equilibrium in some speci¯c cases. The ¯rst result is a direct generalization of a
result in Desgranges and Guesnerie (1996).
17Proposition 3.2. Assume there is a proportion ® of perfectly informed agents
and the remaining proportion (1¡ ®) is non informed (i.e. receives the same
private signal in every state). There is a unique CK equilibrium if and only if
® > 1 ¡ 1=#£ with £ the number of possible values of µ.
Proof. Consider there are N values of µ denoted µ1 < µ2 < ::: < µN. At
step 1, informed agents demand µn ¡ p and non informed agents demand a
quantity in [µ1 ¡ p;µN ¡ p]. Hence aggregate demand in state µnis in Dn =
[®µn + (1¡ ®)µ1 ¡ p;®µn + (1¡ ®)µN ¡ p].
If ® > 1¡1=N, then a given price cannot clear market in more than one state
because the sets Dn do not intersect (n 6= m ) Dn \ Dm = ;). This proves the
"if" part.
If ® ￿ 1¡1=N, thenconsider n0 = argminn(µn+1 ¡ µn). Then Dn0\Dn0+1 6= ;
holds true because of the following inequality holds true (notice (µN ¡ µ1) ¸
(N ¡ 1)(µn0+1 ¡ µn0)):







(µN ¡ µ1) ¸ µn0+1 ¡ µn0
Hence non informed agents do not learn anything at a price in Dn0 \Dn0+1. The
further steps do not help learning because of the same argument. This proves the
"only if" part.
The next proposition shows that perfectly informed agents are, in some sense,
necessary for uniqueness.
Proposition 3.3. Assume that in a given state s, no agent learns from their
private signal that the true value of µ is µ (s) (i.e. fµ(s)g 6= µ (si) for every i),
then there are multiple CK equilibria.
If there are multiple equilibria, then some of them have prices around µ(s) in
states di®erent from s.
Proof. Consider ¯rst ^ S = fµ (s);µ
0g and, without loss of generality, µ(s) > µ
0.
The lemma shows that stability requires:
B
³






, µ0 > ®µ0 +(1 ¡ ®)µ (s)
with ® the proportion of agents distinguishing the two values of µ in state µ
0. This
does not hold true.
The following result shows, that no perfectly informed agents are required
when every agent is well informed enough in some sense (knowing that µ is below
a given threshold, or above).
18Proposition 3.4. Assume that, in every state s, there is at least half of the
population learning from its private signal that µ ¸ µ(s) and there is at least half
of the population learning from its private signal that µ ￿ µ (s).
There is a unique CK equilibrium.




































= ; and uniqueness follows from the
lemma.
The next result shows that, if the information structure is more complex than
the simple case with many perfectly informed agents, then a Non Exclusive Infor-
mation property is required for uniqueness.11 The underlying idea is that if only
one group knows a given piece of information in some state s, then 2 cases are
possible: 1) this group is small and other agents cannot predict aggregate demand
in state s; 2) this group is large and there is some state s0 where this group is not
perfectly informed and agents in this group cannot predict aggregate demand in
state s0.
Proposition 3.5. Assumethe following property of Exclusive Information holds:
there exist a state s and a value µ0 6= µ(s) such that, in state s, only one group i0
of agents knows the true value of µ is not µ
0, i.e.:
9i0=i 6= i0 ) µ
0 2 µ(si)
If there is a unique CK equilibrium, then group i0 is perfectly informed and
its size satis¯es ®i0 > 1=2.
There is no su±cient condition of uniqueness in the proposition because we
make no assumption on other groups'information structure.
11A similar property plays an important role for implementation of the walrassian corre-
spondence (see Palfrey and Srivastava 1986, Postlewaite and Schmeidler 1986). But our NEI
property is de¯ned on groups and not agents (only one group knows a given piece of information
but every agent is the group knows this piece). The NEI property of implementation theory is
always satis¯ed and there is no problem of credible revelation here.
19Proof. Assumewithoutlossofgenerality µ(s) > µ
0. Consider ¯rst ^ S = fµ(s);µ
0g.










, ®i0µ(s)+ (1¡ ®i0)µ
0 > ®i0µ
0 +(1 ¡ ®i0)µ (s)
, ®i0 > 1=2
If the group i0 is not perfectly informed, then there are two states s1 and s2 such
that s1
i0 = s2
i0 and µ(s1) > µ(s2). Then ®i0 > 1=2 B(µ(s1);fµ(s1);µ(s2)g) ￿
B (µ(s2);fµ (s1);µ (s2)g). There are multiple equilibria. Hence group must i0 be
perfectly informed.
4. Multiple equilibria: a "di®use" information structure
In this section, we consider a more general information structure thanabove. This
allows us to de¯ne a condition of the information structure implying multiplicity
of CK-equilibria, whatever the proportion of informed agents. If the information
structure satis¯es this condition, it is said to be "di®use". If it does not, it is
said to be "sharp", according to the terminology of Desgranges and Guesnerie
(1996). The intuition for "di®use" information is that, at some states, no agent is
con¯dent enough in its private signal so that extracting information from price is
useless. More precisely, "di®useness" of information occurs when, at some states,
all the agents need to extract information from the price to obtain information
about the same event.
In the present model, the price can fully reveal the underlying state µ with
probability 1 (in the case of a Rational Expectations Equilibria, that is generically
fully revealing). Hence, the formal de¯nition of "sharp" information will be very
demanding: it will require that, at each state and for each event, some agents at
least knows with probability 1 that this event has not occurred whenever it is the
case.
4.1. An example
We ¯rst present an example of "di®use" information. It relies on the same spirit
as the one in Desgranges and Guesnerie (1996). There are two values µ = B;G
(B < G) of the asset returnand three groups of agents of identical size 1=3 (group
sizes could be di®erent, it will modify the computations only, not the result).
Every agent receives one of the two following signals: a pessimistic one (denoted
-) and an optimistic one (denoted +). Every agent in the same group receives the
same signal. Therefore there are eight pooled signals, depending on which groups
observe - or +. These pooled signals are: (¡ ¡ ¡), (+¡ ¡), (¡ +¡), (¡ ¡ +),
20(¡ + +), (+ ¡ +), (++ ¡) and(+ ++) (thei-thcoordinateisthe signalobserved
by the i-th group).
Assume that 1) the two states (¡ ¡ ¡) and (+ + +) have probability 0, we
forget them from now on;12 2) the three states (+¡ ¡), (¡ + ¡), (¡ ¡ +) where
one group only observes + have positive probability andreveal µ = B; 3) the three
states (+ +¡), (+ +¡), (¡ + +) where two groups observes + have positive
probability and reveal µ = G.
A ¯rst comment is that, contrarily to the example with perfectly informed
agents, everyone's information is incomplete, everyone has the same set of signals
and the value of µ depends on how many agents observe the good signal +. One
easily convinces himself that this example does not correspond to the model in
the preceding sections.
In the preceding sections, we already saw examples where no agent is perfectly
informed and therefore everyone has to learn something from others through the
price in some states at least. But a crucial feature of this example, that is not
satis¯ed by these preceding examples, is that, in some states, all the agents have
to learn from others about the same event. Precisely, in every state where µ = B,
no agent knows with probability 1 that the wrong µ = G has not occurred (and
the similar statement is true in states with µ = G). As µ can take two values
only, this statement is equivalent to no agent knowing the true value of µ, but
we will see in the following section that the generalization to many values of µ
corresponds to the statement "no one knows a given value of µ has not occurred".
We now show that CK equilibria are multiple.
First remind that there is a unique REE that is fully revealing. This is:
p¤(+¡ ¡) = p¤(¡ + ¡) = p¤(¡ ¡ +) = B
p
¤(¡ + +) = p
¤(+ ¡ +) = p
¤(+ +¡) = G
Atthe REE, the priceis equal to thetrue value of µ. Notice that every agent learns
something from the REE price in every state and this feature of the REE exactly
coincides with the just mentioned fact that no agent knows from his private signal
which value of µ has occurred, or not.
Consider a givenprice p. Individual Rationality implies that aggregate demand
can take every value in [B ¡ p;G ¡ p] in every state. Hence, in every state, the
prices compatible with market clearing and rationality are exactly the prices in
[B;G].
For a given price p in [B;G], knowledge of market clearing andrationality does
not restrict further the set of possible states. Namely, p can reveal both µ = B
12Taking account of these two states does not change the result and makes the argmument
less straight.
21and µ = G with an arbitrary probability. Hence, in every state, every demand in
[B ¡ p;G¡ p] is still a best reply to some beliefs.
In a similar way, taking account of the full CK assumptions of market clear-
ing and rationality does not restrict further the set of possible prices. We have
therefore shown the following fact:
Result 5. In every state, every price in [B;G] is a CK-equilibrium price.
In this example, every possible price can reveal any value of µ and no agent can
be certain that the price transmits some information. This is an extreme example
of informational ine±ciency.
4.2. The general case: a more general information structure
Thismore general information structure simply includethe cases where twopooled
signals can reveal the same value of µ (which was impossible in section 2 and 3).
This requires the introduction of some more notations. This case corresponds
to many usual settings that were not included in the model of the preceding
sections. For example, considera information structurewhere every agent observes
the true value of µ with a given probability and another wrong value with the
complementary probability.
Remind agents belong to a ¯nite number I of groups i of size ®i (§®i = 1).
The private information of an agent consists in a signal si in a set Si. Every agent
in the same group i observes the same signal si. The vector s = (s1;:::;sI) is
the pooled signal and S denotes the Cartesian product of the Si. The optimal
demand of the unique asset at price p and observing si is xi(si;p) = E(µjsi;p)¡p.
The conditional mean operator E(µjsi;p) is associated to the agent's beliefs on µ
which is not yet determined at this stage.
Let µ(s) the unique value13 of µ revealed by the pooled signal s and £ the
¯nite set of the possible values of µ. Let ¼ the distribution of the (µ;s) (notice
¼(µjs) > 0 if and only if µ = µ(s)). Let µ(si) the subset of £ consisting in all the
µ compatible with signal si (µ 2 µ(si) if and only if ¼(µjsi) > 0).
Notice that the private information of group i de¯nes a partition on the set
S of the pooled signals (s and s0 belongs to the same element in the partition if
and only if si = s0
i). But, contrarily to the preceding model, it does not de¯ne a
partition on the set of possible values of µ (the sets µ(si) and µ(s0
i) can intersect).
Precisely, private information of some group does not de¯ne a partition of £ if
the cardinal of £ is strictly smaller than the cardinal of S, a situation that could
not happen in the preceding model.
13This is without loss of generality: µ (s) is simply de¯ned as being all the relevant information
revealed by the signal s.
22The price function p¤(s) = µ (s) is a fully revealing REE. It is generically (in
a sense that could be made precise, see Radner 1979) the unique REE.
We now give the de¯nition of sharp and di®use information. We use the ex-
pression "information structure" rather than "information" to emphasize the fact
that this is a requirement on the combinations of the private signals that is needed
for equilibrium to be unique (even if we later write "sharp/di®use information"
for short). The information structure in the preceding model is always sharp (this
is why we introduce the second model).
De¯nition 4.1. The information structure is "sharp" if and only if, for every
pooled signal s in S and every value µ
0 6= µ(s) in £, there exists a group i such
that µ
0 = 2 µ(si), i.e.
8s 2 S;\iµ(si) = fµ (s)g
Otherwise, the information structure is "di®use".
When information is sharp, in every state s, there are agents who learn from
their private signal that a given wrong value µ
0 6= µ(s) has not occurred with
probability 1. When information is di®use, there are at least a state s and a value
µ0 6= µ(s) suchthat no agent learns from his private signal that µ0 has not occurred.
This means that all the agents have to learn a same given piece of information.
With di®use information, informational e±ciency is intuitively very demand-
ing. For instance, in the above example, information is di®use and multiplicity of
CK equilibria obtains. We show that this result is general: when information is
di®use, coordination of all the agents on the REE fully revealing prices cannot be
a consequence of CK of rationality and market clearing only.
We give two propositions completing the preceding results.
Proposition 4.2. If the information structure is di®use, then there are multiple
CK-equilibria.
Remind that the preceding model is a particular case of sharp information
and, in this model, uniqueness obtains if and only if there are "enough correctly
informed" agents (one could show that a similar result holds for an arbitrary
sharp information). Notice that the CK equilibrium exhibited in the proof is in
the spirit of a remark in Hellwig (1980) (noticing that, for his model, the REE
cannot be implemented by a walrassian auctioneer; these cases are made precise
in the next section).
Proof. Consider for example that, in state s0, µ
0 = 2 µ(s0
i) for every i. Consider
the following permutation p(s) of the REE p¤(s) = µ(s): p(s) = µ(s) if s 6= s0
23and p(s0) = µ
0. If every agents expects the REE, then the price function p(:)
clears market in every state (in state s0, everyone learns from p(s0) that µ
0 has
occurred). It is then a CK equilibrium.
We now introducea concept of local CK-equilibrium. Here, "local"means that
the price is always in the neighborhood of a fully revealing price p¤(s) = µ (s),
but this does not mean that prices around p¤(s) = µ(s) only occurs in state s.
Typically, prices around a given value of µ appears in states s associated with a
di®erent value of µ. But the word "local" also means that every agent believes
that a price near p¤(s) = µ(s) reveals s with probability 1 unless he learns from
his private signal that s has not occurred. Therefore, at a local CK equilibrium,
price is not informationally e±cient.
De¯nition 4.3. A local CK-equilibrium is a CK-equilibrium ~ p(:) (i.e. a price
distribution compatible with CK of individual rationality market clearing) such
that the two following assumptions are CK:
i) the price is in the neighborhood of a REE price with probability 1, i.e.:
9" > 0=8s 2 S;P [9s0 2 S=j~ p(s) ¡ p¤(s0)j < "] = 1
ii) every agent expects that a price near the fully revealing REE price p¤(s) =
µ (s) reveals the state s with probability 1, whenever this beliefs is compatible
with his private signal si i.e.
9" > 0=8µ 2 £;8si 2 Si;8p; µ 2 µ(si) and jp¡ µj < " ) Pi(µjsi;p) = 1
with Pi(:jsi;p) the beliefs of an agent observing si and p.
The motivation for this de¯nition is that such price distributions (whenever
they exists) are good candidates for destabilizing the fully revealingREE. Namely,
these equilibria are compatible with CK of rationality, market clearing and ex-
pectations of the REE but, still, they are not necessarily REE, as shown in the
following proposition.
Proposition 4.4. There exists a unique local CK-equilibrium if and only if the
information structure is sharp. This unique CK-equilibrium is the Rational Ex-
pectations equilibrium.
Notice that uniqueness of local CK equilibrium in the sharp case follows from
two steps of the iterative argument only.
RemindalsotheCKcharacterizationoftheREE is stronger theoneof the local
CK equilibrium: this is a price distribution compatible with CK of rationality,
24market clearing and also compatible with the fact that it is itself CK(hence it is
CK that a given price reveals a given value of µ).
Proof. The "only if" part is proved by the proof of the preceding proposition
because the CK equilibrium is local.
We prove the "if" part. Consider a sharp information and a given price p in
the neighborhood of a given REE price p¤(s) = µ(s). In a state s0, a group i
observing s0
i such that µ(s) 2 µ (si) learns from the price that µ(s) has occurred.
Every agent in this group demands µ(s)¡p. Let ® be the proportion of agents in
this case. Every other agent observes s0
i such that µ(s) = 2 µ(si) and his demand
is in [inf µ(si) ¡ p;supµ(si) ¡ p].
If s0 6= s then ® < 1. One checks that µ(s) = 2 µ
1(p), i.e. p cannot clear market
when taking account of the above restrictions on demand. Namely aggregate
demand is in [®µ + (1¡ ®)inf µ(si) ¡p;®µ +(1 ¡ ®)supµ(si)¡ p] and a price p
around p¤(s) = µ (s) can clear market if
µ(s) 2 [®µ (s) + (1¡ ®)infµ (si);®µ (s) +(1 ¡ ®)supµ(si)]
, inf µ(si) ￿ µ (s) ￿ supµ(si)
which is impossible.
5. Implementation by a speci¯c market mechanism
In this section, we de¯ne a simple static market game and we show that the above
CK-equilibria are the price distributions resulting from iterative elimination of
weakly dominated strategies. In our speci¯c game, the elimination process is not
sensitive to the order of elimination of weakly dominated strategies, a drawback
that this process is well known to su®er in many games.
The aim of this section consists only in providing an example of implementa-
tion of CK-equilibria. The implementation mechanism relies on aggregate demand
functions only and it is therefore relatively poor. There is a continuum of agents
of every type. Therefore there exist mechanisms implementing the rational ex-
pectations equilibrium (see La®ont 1985, Palfrey and Srivastava 1986, Postlewaite
and Schmeidler 1986). We rather try to examine what outcomes can obtain with
a mechanism mimicking competitive market clearing.14
The chronology of the game is the following: 1) a state s is randomly drawn
by nature. Every agent observes his private signal only; 2) Every agent submits a
14This game is the one used in Desgranges and Guesnerie (1996), Desgranges, Geo®ard and
Guesnerie (1998), Desgranges (1999a) (1999b). Notice this method of looking at "reasonable"
mechanisms only is advocated in Blume and Easley (1989). Alternative game form can be found
in Dubey, geanakoplos and Shubik (1987).
25demand curve x(si;p) to a "walrassian" auctioneer; 3) The auctioneer determines
the price: it is randomly drawn among the set of all market clearing prices. Each
market clearing price is equiprobable ; 4) the transactions are implemented at the
price p.
This is bayesian game with simultaneous actions. A strategy is a demand
function x(si;p). The selection rule of the auctioneer among the market clearing
prices can be arbitrary as long as it gives positive probability to every market
clearing price.15
One can naturally associate to every pro¯le of strategy the price distribution
that it generates. In particular, the price distribution associated to a Nash equi-
librium is a stochastic REE (we did not de¯ne stochastic REEs properly but the
de¯nition of the REE extends to the case of a price distribution quite easily).
The ¯rst proposition shows that implementation in Nash equilibrium of the fully
revealing REE is not always possible.
Proposition 5.1. The fully revealing REE p¤(s) = µ(s) is the price distribu-
tion associated to a Nash equilibrium of the game if and only if the information
structure is sharp.
We donot know what aNashequilibrium lookslikewheninformationisdi®use.
There may be multiple Nash equilibria only if there are multiple REE, which is
not the case generically.
Proof. The proof of the "if" part is tedious but not di±cult. It consists in
checking that demand can be chosen at every REE price p¤(s) such that it clears
market in state s only. We do not give it here (see Desgranges 1999a).
We prove the "only if" part. If information is di®use, then there is a state s
such that µ0 2 \iµ(si) for some µ0 6= µ(s). Assume there is a Nash equilibrium
sustaining the fully revealing REE. At this Nash equilibrium, in state s and at
price µ
0, every agent believes that the price reveals µ
0. Hence aggregate demand
is 0 at this price and the auctioneer sometimes chooses price µ
0 in state s. This
contradicts this outcome being part of a Nash equilibrium.
This result can be compared with the analogous result about local CK equilib-
rium in Section 4. They both suggest that, when information is di®use, it is very
demanding to obtain the REE as a plausible outcome of a competitive market.
We now show that CK equilibrium have a precise counterpart in the market
game.
15Desgranges and Guesnerie (1996), Desgranges (1999a) show that selection of the smallest
market clearing price partially change the results.
26Proposition 5.2. Consider the set of strategies surviving to in¯nitely repeated
elimination of all weakly dominate strategies. The price distributions associated
with strategies in this set are the CK equilibria.
The proof is omitted. It is given in Desgranges (1999a).
Weakly dominated strategies (not only strictly dominated) have to be deleted
in order to restrict out of equilibrium beliefs. This is required to meet the set of
CK equilibrium. Namely, if a CK equilibrium appears as an outcome of the game,
then this means that agents have submitted demand curves chosen in accordance
with the consequences of the CK assumptions, even at prices with probability 0.
In this game, elimination of weakly dominated strategies is not sensitive to
order of elimination as shown in the following proposition. We say that a strategy
X id dominated by a strategy Y on the set P of strategy pro¯les if and only if Y
gives a higher or equal payo® than X against every strategy pro¯le in P and it a
strictly higher payo® for at least one strategy pro¯le in P.
Proposition 5.3. Consider asequence of strategy pro¯les (i.e. demandfunctions
x(si;p)) EN satisfying:
i) E0 is the set of all the strategies,
ii) for every N, EN+1 contains every strategy in EN that are not weakly dom-
inated by another strategy in EN on the set EN ,
iii) for every N, si EN contains a weakly dominated strategy on EN, then
EN+1 Ã EN.
Then the sequence EN converges to a limit set E1 and the price distributions
associated to the strategy pro¯les in E1 are the CK equilibria.
The proof is omitted. It is in Desgranges (1999a).
At every step of the sequence EN, some weakly dominated strategies are
deleted, but not necessarily all of them. Point iii) means that elimination of
strategies stops when there is no dominated strategy anymore only.
This result means that the prices distributions does not depend on the order
of elimination. However, the proof shows that the set of strategies does depend
on the order of elimination (but not at prices appearing with positive probability
at a CK equilibrium).
6. Extensions: the case of many goods
In this section, we argue that the main result of Section 4 generalizes to a generic
economy with ¯nitely many goods and arbitrary utility functions.
27The model is the same as above except there are many goods and the (state
dependant) utility function only satis¯es the usual concavity and smoothness as-
sumptions. Precisely:
² thecontinuum [0;1] of in¯nitesimalagents exchangeN goods. p =
¡
p1;:::;pN¢
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is his initial endowment (ej is type independent).
Every function uj(µ;:) is C2, increasing withrespect to every xn
j andstrictly
concave.
We ¯rst give standard de¯nitions an results about REE.
A REE is a price function p¤(:) such that the allocation xj [p¤(s)] is feasible
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A fully revealing equilibrium is a REE p¤(:) such that, for every s and s0,
µ (s) 6= µ(s0) implies p¤(s) 6= p¤(s0).
The next result is well known. To prove existence, it is enough to consider
the modi¯ed economy obtained by assuming that the pooled signal s is public.
One checks that the equilibrium of this economy with complete information is a
separating one (and therefore it is a fully revealing REE of the initial economy).
The genericity of the result obtains with transversality argument. We do not give
a formal de¯nition of the genericity.
Result 6 (Radner 1979, Pietra and Siconol¯ 1998). For generic speci¯ca-
tions of utility and endowments, there exists a REE and every REE is fully re-
vealing. A fully revealing REE depends on preferences and endowments but not
on the information structure.
28We now generalize theproposition in section 4stating whenuniquenessof local
CK equilibrium obtains. A careful examination of the proof shows that the same
conditions of uniqueness holds under mild assumptions. One only needs that, at
every REE price, the aggregate demand of the modi¯ed economy with complete
information takes non singular values (a usual assumption in general equilibrium
theory).
Notice that the set of CK equilibria depends on the information structure,
whereas existence of fully revealing equilibrium does not.
Proposition 6.1. For generic speci¯cations of utility and endowments, when the
economy admits a fully revealing REE, the following equivalence holds true: a
fully revealing REE is the only local CK equilibrium if and only if the information
structure is sharp.
7. Conclusion
In a competitive setting with asymmetric information, we have de¯ned a CK
equilibrium. This equilibrium concept is similar to the traditional REE except
the price distribution has not to be perfectly expected. We only require that
expectations are compatible with CK of rationality and market clearing. REE
appears as a speci¯c CK equilibrium. The main consequence of this de¯nition is
that equilibrium behavior is compatible with incorrect learning from the price.
We give two kinds of results. The ¯rst results (Section 3) emphasize that many
informed agents are required for an e±cient market. These agents need not be
perfectly informed, but each "piece" of information has to be known by a large
enough proportion of the population. The second result is a necessary and su±-
cient condition for local uniqueness of equilibrium, with an appropriate de¯nition
of a local CK equilibrium (prices near the REE prices and CK of expectations
of e±cient prices). This uniqueness condition of "sharp" information holds true
in a very general context. When the information structure is not "sharp" but
"di®use", then, in some states, all the agents have to learn a same given piece of
information. In those states, the CK assumptions are compatible with expecta-
tional mistakes.
We give an example of implementation of CK equilibrium. This is implemen-
tation in iteratively undominated strategies in a static market game. Hence a
natural interpretation of this solution concept is the so-called "eductive" learning
in virtual time (see Guesnerie 1992). It assumes that every agent computes the
set of outcomes compatible with the CK assumptions and, whenever he predicts
the only possible outcome is a REE, he plays a REE strategy. But an interesting
question would be to ¯nd a class of learning algorithms converging to the CK
equilibria.
29This approach sheds light on the role played by expectations coordination for
market e±ciency. This point is forgotten by the REE approach (including re-
peated Bayesian learning, Vives 1993). However, learning by bounded rational
agents considers possible expectational mistakes. At ¯rst sight, this recent litera-
ture (see Blume and Easley 1999, Routledge 1999, this line of work originates in
Bray 1982) suggests a more e±cient market than the CK approach in this paper
does. An important point would then be to relate these approaches more precisely.
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